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Abstract We provide an axiomatization of an additively separable social welfare
function in the context of Harsanyi’s impartial observer theorem. To do this, we refor-
mulate Harsanyi’s setting to make the lotteries over the identities the observer may
assume independent of the social alternative.
1 Introduction
This article revisits Harsanyi (1953, 1955, 1977) utilitarian impartial observer
theorem. Consider a society of individuals I. The society has to choose among a
set A of social alternatives, with a generic element denoted by a. Each individual i
has preferences i over these social alternatives. These preferences are known and
they differ. In Harsanyi’s set up, the set of social alternatives are identified with the set
S. Grant (B)
Department of Economics, Rice University, Houston, TX, USA
e-mail: simongrant@uq.edu.au
S. Grant
School of Economics, University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
A. Kajii
Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan
B. Polak
Department of Economics, School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
Z. Safra
University of Exeter, Exeter, UK
Z. Safra
The College of Management, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
123
Author's personal copy
Published in Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 39, Issue 4, October 2012, Pages 833-846.
http://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0563-0
834 S. Grant et al.
of probability measures (that is, ‘lotteries’) over a set of final social outcomes, which
we shall denote by X , with generic element x . In that case i’s preference relation i
corresponds to her risk preferences over the set of lotteries on X , denoted by  (X ).
To help choose among social outcomes, Harsanyi proposes that each individual
should imagine herself as an ‘(impartial) observer’ who does not know which person
she will be. From the perspective of the observer, not only does she face uncertainty
about which social outcome in X will obtain, but she also faces uncertainty over which
identity in I she will assume. Harsanyi takes the observer’s preferences to be over the
set of lotteries defined on the set of extended outcomes, I ×X , that we shall denote by
 (I × X ). In forming preferences over  (I × X ), the observer is forced to make
interpersonal comparisons; for example, she is forced to compare being person i in
(final) social outcome x with being person j in (final) social outcome x ′.
Harsanyi assumes the acceptance principle: that is, when the observer imagines her-
self being person i she adopts person i’s preferences over the social alternatives which
in his case are the outcome lotteries in  (X ). He also assumes that all individuals are
expected utility maximizers, and that they continue to be so in the role of an observer.
Harsanyi argues that these Bayesian rationality axioms force the observer to be a
(weighted) utilitarian in the following sense: over all extended lotteries e ∈  (I × X ),
the observer’s preferences admit a representation of the form
V (e) =
∑
i
zei Ui
(
ei
)
, (1)
where for each i in I, zei is the probability assigned by the extended lottery e to assum-
ing the identity i, ei is the distribution over X associated with e conditional on identity
i being assumed, and Ui () :=
∫
X ui (x)(dx) is person i’s expected utility for the
lottery  over final social states.
By considering extended lotteries with a uniform marginal distribution over iden-
tities, that is, a marginal distribution over identities that assigns an equal-chance 1/I
for the observer assuming each identity i in I and by assuming that the outcome
lotteries are public (that is, all individuals face the same outcome lottery or equiv-
alently e is a product lottery with ei = ej for all i and j), Harsanyi argues that
the function V (·) given in (1), can be used to obtain an ‘impartial’ ranking of the
outcome lotteries (and hence, the associated social policies). That is, for any pair
of outcome lotteries  and ′ in  (X ), the observer ‘impartially’ ranks  above ′
if
∑
i I−1 × Ui () >
∑
i I−1 × Ui
(
′
)
. This is essentially the method Weymark
(1991) uses to obtain an impartial ranking over social policies in his formalization of
Harsanyi’s impartial observer theorem.1
As we pointed out in our companion paper (Grant et al. 2010, pp. 1957–1958),
Harsanyi’s approach requires that the observer engages in what he refers to as imagi-
native empathy:
1 Roemer (1992) observes that such a notion of impartiality reduces any consideration of social justice to
simply one of rational prudence on the part of the observer. He, among others, contends that this constitutes
an inadequate basis for a theory of social justice.
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This must obviously involve [her] imagining [her]self to be placed in individual
i’s objective position, i.e., to be placed in the objective positions (e.g., income,
wealth, consumption level, state of health, social position) that i would face in
social situation x . But it must also involve assessing these objective conditions
in terms of i’s own subjective attitudes and personal preferences … rather than
assessing them in terms of [her] own subjective attitudes and personal pref-
erences. [Harsanyi 1977, p. 52: notation changed to ours but emphasis in the
original]2
The knowledge and acceptance of individual preferences embodied in imaginative
empathy implies agreement across all potential observers for pairs of the form (i, )
and (i, ′) since by acceptance this is determined solely by i . As Broome (1993) and
Mongin (2001) have pointed out (and as Harsanyi (1977, p. 57) himself concedes),
however, it does not imply agreement in ranking pairs of the form (i, ) and ( j, ′)
where i = j . For example, each observer can have her own rankings across others’
subjective and objective positions.
In this article, we shall retain the assumption that an observer can engage in imagi-
native empathy. As the focus of our analysis is on the representation such an observer’s
preferences may admit, we do not address the issue of the lack of agreement across
potential observers.3 Rather our point of departure from Harsanyi is that we do not
require the set of social alternatives, A, to correspond to a set of lotteries over some set
of final social states. Hence individual i’s preferences i need not correspond to her
‘risk’ preferences. As a consequence, we shall only require an observer’s preferences
to be defined over the set of identity lottery/social alternative pairs. That is, we take the
domain of the observer’s preferences to be (I)×A, with a generic element denoted
by the pair (z, a), where z is an identity lottery in (I) and a is a social alternative
in A.
First notice that this still entails that the observer can make interpersonal com-
parisons between pairs of the form (i, a) and ( j, a′) for any i = j and any pair of
alternatives a and a′. However, it does not require her preferences to extend to the
set (I × A) the set of lotteries defined on identity/social alternative pairs which is
strictly larger than (I) × A.
From a conceptual viewpoint, one advantage of working with preferences defined
on a smaller domain is that it makes less strenuous demands on the ‘empathetic imagi-
nation’ of the observer. Furthermore, if we take the view that randomizations involving
known or objective probabilities are themselves purely hypothetical constructs used to
help calibrate the observer’s comparisons of interpersonal utility, then our domain for
the observer’s preferences has the virtue that such randomizations only take place in
the (already) hypothetical setting in which the observer is not yet aware of the identity
2 Rawls also appeals to such imaginative empathy: A competent judge … must not consider his own de
facto preferences as the necessarily valid measure of the actual worth of those interests which come before
him, but…be both able and anxious to determine, by imaginative appreciation, what those interests mean to
persons who share them, and to consider them accordingly. [Rawls 1951, p. 179 quoted in Pattanaik (1968,
pp. 1157–1158)]. See also Sen’s (1979) behavioral and introspective bases for interpersonal comparisons
of welfare.
3 So we shall not claim the special designation of impartial for the observer’s preferences.
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she will assume. Even if randomizations involving known or objective probabilities
are well defined in the real world, so that for example, following Harsanyi, we take
A = (X ), we argue in Grant et al. (2010) that the adoption of  (I × X ) as the
domain for the observer’s preferences entails conflating ‘hypothetical’ randomiza-
tions with ‘real’ randomizations which may well put us at odds with the acceptance
principle.
As an illustration of this last point, consider a society comprising two individu-
als i and j , and a perfectly divisible private good that is to be allocated between
them. We take the set of final social outcomes to be X =[0, 1], with the inter-
pretation that x ∈ [0, 1], is the social outcome in which i gets the fraction x
of the good and j gets the remaining 1 − x . There exists an objective random-
izing device, so we take the set of alternatives A = ([0, 1]) with generic ele-
ment denoted by . Suppose each individual cares only about the amount of the
good she receives and the observer’s own interpersonal assessments are such that
(i, x) ∼ ( j, 1 − x) for all x in [0, 1]. That is, she is indifferent between being
person i with share s of the good and being person j with the same share s of
the good. Let ′ denote the outcome lottery for which there is a half chance x
equals 1 and a half chance x equals 0. That is, ′ is the lottery in which each
person has a half chance of getting the whole good and a half chance of get-
ting none. Now if the observer’s preferences are defined on ({i, j} × [0, 1]) and
she is an expected utility maximizer then it readily follows from her interpersonal
assessments (i, 1) ∼ ( j, 0) and (i, 0) ∼ ( j, 1) that she must be indifferent as to
which identity she assumes when facing the lottery ′, that is,
( j, ′) ∼ (i, ′).
But suppose i exhibits risk aversion and can be represented by the expected util-
ity functional Ui () =
∫ 1
0
√
x (dx) while  j is risk neutral, and so can be rep-
resented by the functional U j () =
∫ 1
0 (1 − x)  (dx). It follows that person i is
indifferent between ′ and the (degenerate) lottery in which x = 1/4 for sure.
Person j on the other hand is indifferent between ′ and the (degenerate) lot-
tery in which x = 1/2 for sure. Again combining acceptance with the observer’s
interpersonal assessments, we now have that the observer must prefer facing the
lottery ′ as person j . That is, ( j, ′)  (i, ′), contradicting the previous conclu-
sion that the observer must be indifferent as to which identity she assumes when
facing ′.
It may seem tempting to attribute the problem to the assumption that the observer’s
preferences conform to (standard) expected utility. And indeed preferences defined on
 (I × X ) that exhibit so-called ‘issue preference’ can accommodate the pattern of
preference exhibited in the example.4 The advantage of restricting the domain as we
do in this article is that it keeps these issues apart from the start. It is possible for the
observer to treat them as equivalent but that becomes a property of the preferences. Our
main result, however, is that one can conduct Harsanyi’s analysis within this restricted
domain. Indeed, we show (see Theorem 1 below) that by imposing acceptance and a
form of independence that applies to mixtures of identity lotteries, this leads to the
existence of an additively separable representation of the form:
4 See, for example, Ergin and Gul (2009).
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V (z, a) =
∑
i
zi Vi (a),
where zi is again the probability of assuming person i’s identity and Vi (a) is a repre-
sentation of person i’s preferences i .
2 Set up and notation
Let society consist of a finite set of individuals I = {1, . . . , I }, I ≥ 2, with generic
elements i and j . The set of social alternatives is denoted by A with generic element a.
The set A is assumed to have more than one element and to be a compact metrizable
space.
Each individual i in I is endowed with a preference relation i defined over the
set of social alternatives A. We assume throughout that for each i in I, the preference
relation i is a complete, transitive and continuous binary relation on A, and that
its asymmetric part i is non-empty. Hence for each i , there exists a non-constant
function Vi : A → R, satisfying for any a and a′ in A, Vi (a) ≥ Vi (a′) if and only if
a i a′. In summary, a society may be characterized by the tuple 〈A, I, {i }i∈I〉.
In Harsanyi’s story, an observer imagines herself behind a veil of ignorance, uncer-
tain about which identity she will assume in the given society. Let  (I) denote the
set of identity lotteries on I. Let z denote the typical element of  (I), and let zi
denote the probability assigned by the identity lottery z to individual i . They represent
the imaginary risks in the mind of the observer of being born as someone else.5 With
slight abuse of notation, we will let i or sometimes [i] denote the degenerate identity
lottery that assigns probability weight 1 to the observer’s assuming the identity of
individual i .
As discussed above, we assume that the identity lotteries faced by the observer
are independent of the social alternative; that is, she faces a identity lottery/social
alternative pair (z, a) ∈ (I) × A.
The observer is endowed with a preference relation  defined over (I) × A. We
assume throughout that  is complete, transitive and continuous, and that its asym-
metric part  is non-empty, and so it admits a (non-trivial) continuous representation
V : (I) × A → R. That is, for any two pairs, (z, a) and (z′, a′), (z, a)  (z′, a′) if
and only if V (z, a) ≥ V (z′, a′).
3 Generalized utilitarianism
In this section, we adapt the axioms from Harsanyi’s observer theorem to apply to the
framework of identity lottery/social alternative pairs.
The first axiom is Harsanyi’s acceptance principle. In degenerate identity lottery/
social alternative pairs of the form (i, a) or
(
i, a′
)
, the observer knows she will assume
5 Recall our discussion in the introduction of the ‘imaginative empathy’ required by the observer to formu-
late her preferences. For a more extensive discussion on what it is an individual imagines and knows when
she imagines herself in the role of the observer see Grant et al. (2010, Sect. 7).
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identity i for sure. The acceptance principle requires that, in this case, the observer’s
preferences  must coincide with that individual’s preferences i over social alter-
natives.
The acceptance principle. For all i in I and all a, a′ ∈ A, a i a′ if and only if
(i, a) 
(
i, a′
)
.
Next, in the spirit of Harsanyi, we assume that the observer’s preferences also sat-
isfy independence. Here, however, we need to be careful. First, the set of identity
lottery/social alternative pairs  (I) × A is not a convex set. Not all probability mix-
tures of identity lottery/social alternative pairs are well defined. Therefore, the axiom
we adopt applies independence over pairs of lottery/social alternatives for which prob-
ability mixtures are well defined.6
Independence over identity lotteries (for the impartial observer). Suppose
(z, a), (z′, a′) ∈  (I) × A are such that (z, a) ∼ (z′, a′). Then, for all z˜, z˜′ ∈
(I): (z˜, a)  (z˜′, a′) if and only if (λz˜ + (1 − λ) z, a)  (λz˜′ + (1 − λ) z′, a′)
for all λ in (0, 1].
To understand this axiom, first notice that the two mixtures on the right side of the
implication are identical to λ(z˜, a) + (1 − λ) (z, a) and λ(z˜′, a′) + (1 − λ) (z′, a′),
respectively. These two mixtures of identity lottery/social alternative pairs are well
defined since they each involve the mixture of two identity lotteries holding the social
alternative fixed. Second, notice that the identity lottery/social alternative pairs, (z, a)
and (z′, a′), that are ‘mixed in’ with weight (1 − λ) are themselves indifferent. The
axiom states that ‘mixing in’ two indifferent identity lottery/social alternative pairs
(with equal weight) preserves the original preference between (z˜, a) and (z˜′, a′) prior
to mixing.
One technical remark that might interest some readers. In the axiom, we allow the
mixing of identity lotteries to occur at two different social alternatives; that is, we
do not restrict a to equal a′. We could define a weaker axiom—call it conditional
independence—that simply imposes independence over identity lotteries at each fixed
social alternative a¯. That is, for all a¯ ∈ A, if z, z′ ∈  (I) are such that (z, a¯) ∼
(z′, a¯) then for all z˜, z˜′ ∈ (I), (z˜, a¯)  (z˜′, a¯) if and only if (αz˜ + (1 − α) z, a¯) 
(αz˜′ + (1 − α) z′, a¯) for all α in (0, 1]. Our stronger axiom is necessary for the rep-
resentation result that follows. To show this, Example 1 in the Appendix presents an
example in which the set of alternatives is a set of lotteries over some set of final
outcomes (that is, A =  (X )), each individual is an expected utility maximizer and
the observer’s preferences satisfy both the acceptance principle and conditional inde-
pendence over identity lotteries but does not satisfy the (unconditional) independence
axiom over identity lotteries defined above.
As our main result states, in conjunction with acceptance, independence over iden-
tity lotteries is all we need to ensure the observer’s preferences admit a generalized
utilitarian representation.
6 Our axiom is similar to Karni and Safra (2000) ‘constrained independence’ axiom, but their axiom applies
to all joint distributions over identities and social alternatives, not just to identity-lottery/social alternative
pairs.
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Theorem 1 The following are equivalent:
(a) The observer’s preferences  satisfy the acceptance principle and independence
over identity lotteries.
(b) There exist a continuous function V :  (I) × A → R and, for each i in I, a
function Vi : A → R, such that V represents ; for each i, Vi represents i ;
and for all (z, a) in  (I) × A
V (z, a) =
I∑
i=1
zi Vi (a).
The proof appears in an Appendix but let us just note here that the main step is
to show that we can always find a countable number of ‘preference intervals’ with
‘end-points’ consisting of identity lottery/social alternative pairs of the form
(
i, aˆ
) ( j, aˆ) that cover the indifference sets. For a given preference interval with end points(
i, aˆ
)  ( j, aˆ), independence over identity lotteries enables us to construct a repre-
sentation Vˆ (z, a) that is affine in z, for all identity lottery/social alternative pairs (z, a)
that lie in this preference interval
(
that is, for which
(
i, aˆ
)
 (z, a) 
( j, aˆ)). We
then construct a representation that is affine in identity lotteries using these intervals.
One complication is that the intervals may not overlap. Without such overlapping,
we do not obtain uniqueness. The precise condition guaranteeing uniqueness is given
in terms of the representation in Case 1 of the proof of Theorem 1. To express this
condition as a property of the preferences first let us say an identity lottery/social
alternative pair (z, a) is non-extreme (wrt ) if there exists two other pairs identity lot-
tery/social alternative pairs
(
z′, a′
)
and
(
z′′, a′′
)
such that
(
z′, a′
)  (z, a)  (z′′, a′′).
Loosely speaking, the condition on the observer’s preferences guaranteeing unique-
ness is that any non-extreme identity lottery/social alternative pair must lie in the
‘interior’ of some ‘preference interval’ of the form discussed above. More formally,
we require:
Property U For each non-extreme (wrt ) identity lottery/social alternative pair
(z, a) in  (I) × A, there exists a social alternative a¯ in A and two individuals i
and j in I such that (i, a¯)  (z, a)  ( j, a¯).
In Grant et al. (2010, Theorem 1, p. 1947), we obtained uniqueness for our gen-
eralized utilitarian representation by imposing a richness condition on the domain of
individual preferences that assumed none of the social alternatives under consideration
was Pareto dominated.
Absence of unanimity For all a, a′ in A, if a i a′ for some i in I, then there
exists j in I such that a′ i a.
We argued in that article the condition was perhaps a natural restriction in the con-
text of Harsanyi’s thought experiment for a society of expected utility maximizers. In
the current context where the theorem deals with the social alternatives themselves
and not lotteries over social alternatives it might again be argued this is a natural
restriction since the exercise is motivated by the need to make social choices when
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agents disagree. We do not need to imagine ourselves as an impartial observer facing
an identity lottery to rule out social alternatives that are Pareto dominated.7
The next proposition shows that in the context of Theorem 1 absence of unanimity
is sufficient to ensure Property U holds and so the generalized utilitarian representation
is unique up to common affine transformations of the functions Vi .
Proposition 1 Suppose the observer’s preferences  satisfy the acceptance prin-
ciple and independence over identity lotteries. Then absence of unanimity implies
Property U.
4 Applications and related literature
If, as Harsanyi did, we take A to be the set of lotteries over some set of social out-
comes X , then the observer preferences  are defined on the set of product lotteries
 (I)× (X ), and Theorem 1 implies there exists a generalized utilitarian represen-
tation of the form
V (z, ) =
I∑
i=1
zi Vi () .
This is the same representation we obtain in our companion paper (Grant et al. 2010,
Lemma 8). And since we also assume there absence of unanimity we are able to show
this representation is unique (up to common affine transformations of the functions
Vi s). The combination of acceptance and that each individual is an expected util-
ity maximizer also means that each function Vi () can be expressed as a monotonic
transformation of that individual’s expected utility. That is, Vi () = φi ◦Ui (), where
Ui (·) is an expected utility representation of i (see Grant et al. 2010, Theorem 1 ).
Safra and Weissengrin (2003) also obtain a unique representation. Instead of requiring
an existential axiom, however, they strengthen Independence over Identity Lotteries
so that the independence property holds for any mixture of two product lotteries that
is itself a product lottery. For example, if (z, ) ∼ (z′, ′) then they require (z, ˜) 
(z˜′, ′) if and only if
λ(z, ˜) + (1 − λ) (z, ) =
(
z, λ˜ + (1 − λ)
)

(
λz˜′ + (1 − λ) z′, ′)
= λ (z˜′, ′) + (1 − λ) (z′, ′) ,
for all λ in (0, 1). Moreover, in combination with acceptance their stronger inde-
pendence axiom implies each individual is an expected utility maximizer and each
function Vi () is itself an expected utility representation of i .
Karni and Safra (2000) can also be recast as a special case of Theorem 1 for which
A =  (X )n . That is, the observer may be viewed as having preferences over  (I)×
7 However, if A =  (X ) and the individuals are not expected utility maximizers, then it could be the case
an outcome lottery  in  (X ) might not be Pareto dominated and so potentially might be ranked optimal
by the observer even if every pure alternative in its support was Pareto dominated.
123
Author's personal copy
Generalized representation theorem 841
 (X )n , each individual has a personal conditional outcome lottery i in place of
the common outcome lottery  and so the representation obtained takes the form,
V (z, 1, . . . , n) = ∑Ii=1 zi Vi (i ).8
Finally, consider the situation where individual preferences are defined over purely
subjectively uncertain acts. In particular, let S be a state space (possibly infinite), let
 be a (σ−)algebra of subsets of S (the set of measurable events) and assume that
i are defined over the set of simple -adapted acts F .9 Taking A = F , Theorem 1
implies that  admits a representation of the form V (z, f ) = ∑Ii=1 zi Vi ( f ), where
Vi is a representation of i . If we required each individual to be a subjective expected
utility maximizer then, for each i , there would exist a probability measure πi defined
on , a (Bernoulli) utility index ui : X → R, and a strictly increasing real-valued
function φi , such that Vi ( f ) = φi
(∑
x∈X πi
( f −1 (x)) ui (x)
)
. Corresponding repre-
sentations would be generated if an individual conformed to any of the generalizations
of subjective expected utility that have appeared in the literature over the past 25 years
to accommodate Allais and/or Ellsberg type ‘paradoxical’ behaviors.
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Appendix A: Example
Example 1 shows that the observer’s preferences can satisfy the acceptance princi-
ple and conditional independence over identity lotteries for the impartial observer,
moreover every individual is an expected utility maximizer and yet the observer’s
preferences do not satisfy the (unconditional) independence axiom over identity lot-
teries. Hence by Theorem 1 these preferences do not admit a generalized utilitarian
representation.
In this example, I ={1, 2} and A =  ({x1, x2}). To simplify notation, for each
z ∈  (I), let q = z2; and for each outcome lottery  ∈ A let p := (x2). Then, with
slight abuse of notation, we write (q, p) 
(
q ′, p′
)
for (z, ) 
(
z′, ′
)
, and write
V (q, p) for V (z, a).
Example 1 Let agent 1 ’s preferences be given by U1 (p) = − (2p − 1) /4, and let
agent 2’s preferences be given by U2 (p) = 3 (2p − 1) /4. Notice that these individual
preferences satisfy independence. Let the impartial observer’s preferences be given
by V (q, p) = (2p − 1) (q2 − 1/4).
8 Notice there is a natural homeomorphism h :  (I)× (X )n →  (I×X ), where h (z, 1, . . . , n)=e
is the extended lottery defined by setting e (i, x) := zi × i (x). Thus this example also encompasses
Harsanyi’s original setting where the impartial observer’s preferences are defined over the set of extended
lotteries  (I × X ).
9 That is, f : S → X is in F , if the range of f is finite and for every x in X , f −1 (x) ∈ .
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By construction, these preferences satisfy the acceptance principle. To show that
they satisfy conditional independence over identity lotteries, notice that for each
fixed p¯, the function V (q, p¯) is monotone in q. If p¯ = 1/2, then the impartial observer
is indifferent over all q and conditional independence follows trivially. If p¯ > 1/2, then
(q˜, p¯) 
(
q˜ ′, p¯
)
if and only if q˜ ≥ q˜ ′. Thus, for all α ∈ (0, 1], (αq˜ + (1 − α) q, p¯) 
(αq˜ ′ + (1 − α) q, p¯) if and only if q˜ ≥ q˜ ′. The case for p¯ < 1/2 is similar.
To show that these preferences violate (unconditional) independence over iden-
tity lotteries, let p = 0 and let p′ = 1. Let q = q ′ = 1/2 so that V (q, p) =
V (q ′, p′) = 0. Let q˜ = 0 and let q˜ ′ = 1/√2 so that V (q˜, p) = V (q˜ ′, p′) =
1/4. Let α = 1/2. Then V (αq˜ + (1 − α) q, p) = − ((1/4)2 − 1/4) = 3/16. But
V (αq˜ ′ +
(
1−α
)
q ′, p′) =
(
1/4+1
/(
2
√
2
))2 −1/4 =
(
1/16+1/8+1/
(
4
√
2
)
−
1/4
)
=
(
3/16 +
(
1 − √2
)/(
4
√
2
))
< 3/16, violating (unconditional) indepen-
dence.
unionsq
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1 Since the representation is affine in identity lotteries and each Vi
represents i , it is immediate that the represented preferences satisfy the axioms. We
will show that the axioms imply the representation.
The idea of the proof is to cover the space  (I) × A with preference intervals of
the form
{
(z, a) ∈  (I) × A : (i, a′)  (z, a)  ( j, a′) for some i, j ∈ I and a′ ∈ A} ,
then to define an affine function for every such interval and, finally, to glue these
functions to obtain the desired representation. But there might exist problem product
lotteries (z, a) (other than just the best or the worst, which exist by compactness and
continuity) such that no social alternative a′ and individuals i and j exist with the
property above. If (z, a) is a such a problem identity lottery/social alternative pair
then all identity lottery/social alternative pairs in its indifference set have the same
problem.
Let V˜ be a continuous utility function representing  that we can use as a bench-
mark to label indifference sets and let T denote its image. Without loss of generality,
assume that T is a subset of [0, 1] with {0, 1} ∈ T . Note that T is closed. Let us define
the set of problem indifference levels as follows
V =
{
v ∈ T \{0, 1} : i, j ∈ I and a ∈ A s.t. V˜ (i, a) > v > V˜ ( j, a)
}
∪ {0} (if V˜ (i, a) = 0 ⇒ ∀ j ∈ I V˜ ( j, a) = 0)
∪ {1} (if V˜ (i, a) = 1 ⇒ ∀ j ∈ I V˜ ( j, a) = 1)
The set V is closed. Suppose not. That is, let vn → v be a sequence in V where
v ∈ T \V and assume first that v = 0, 1. Hence there exist i, j ∈ I and a ∈ A such
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that V˜ (i, a) > v > V˜ ( j, a). Then for sufficiently large n, V˜ (i, a) > vn > V˜ ( j, a):
a contradiction. If v = 0, assume there exist i ∈ I and a ∈A such that V˜ (i, a)>0 and
then, for sufficiently large n, V˜ (i, a) > vn > 0: a contradiction. Similarly, if v = 1
let j ∈ I and a ∈ A be such that 1 > V˜ ( j, a) and continue as above.
By the definition of V , if V˜ (z, a) = v ∈ V then either mini V˜ (i, a) ≥ v
or maxi V˜ (i, a) ≤ v. By independence over identity lotteries, maxi V˜ (i, a) ≥
V˜ (z, a) ≥ mini V˜ (i, a). Hence, there exists at least one individual j such that
V˜ ( j, a) = v. And, using independence over identity lotteries again, V˜ (z, a) = v
implies V (i, a) = v for all individuals i in the support of the identity lottery z.10
The proof proceeds in three cases.
Case 1 Assume that the set V is empty. For each t in T \ {0, 1} we can find a
social alternative at for which there exist individuals i t and j t such that V˜ (i t , at) >
t > V˜
( j t , at). Similarly, for t = 0 there exists a0 and individuals i0 and j0
with V˜
(
i0, a0
)
> 0 = V˜ ( j0, a0) and, for t = 1, there exists a1 and individu-
als i1 and j1 with V˜ (i1, a1) = 1 > V˜ ( j1, a1). Note that, by independence over
identity lotteries, the intervals (V˜
( j t , at) , V˜ (i t , at)), [V˜ ( j0, a0) , V˜ (i0, a0)) and
(V˜
( j1, a1) , V˜ (i1, a1)] are subsets of T and hence T is open (relative to [0, 1]). As
T is also closed, it follows that T = [0, 1].
Let
BL0 =
{
(z, a) ∈  (I) × A : V˜
(
i0, a0
)
> V˜ (z, a) ≥ V˜
(
j0, a0
)}
BL1 =
{
(z, a) ∈  (I) × A : V˜
(
i1, a1
)
≥ V˜ (z, a) > V˜
(
j1, a1
)}
and, for t ∈ (0, 1)
BLt =
{
(z, a) ∈  (I) × A : V˜ (i t , at) > V˜ (z, a) > V˜ ( j t , at)
}
By compactness of  (I) × A, its open cover {BLt}t∈[0,1] contains a finite cover{
BLt1 , . . . , BLtK
}
, where the intersection of any two adjacent sets is non-empty.
Next we show that, for each k, a representing function for  of the form V k (z, a) =
i zi V ki (a) can be constructed on the closure of BLtk .11 For each (z, a) ∈ BLtk , let
V k(z, a) be defined by
(
V k(z, a)
[
i tk
] +
(
1 − V k(z, a)
) [ j tk ] , atk
)
∼ (z, a) .
10 Moreover, for all v in the interior of V, V˜ (i, a) = v for all individuals i . Let j satisfy V˜ ( j, a) = v and
suppose, by way of negation and without loss of generality, that V˜ (i, a) < v for some i . Then for all v′
such that V˜ (i, a) < v′ < v, we have V˜ (i, a) < v′ < V˜ ( j, a). A contradiction to v being interior.
11 This is similar to Case 1 in Safra and Weissengrin (2003, p. 184). This case is also analogous to Case
1 of Karni and Safra (2000, p. 320) except that, in their setting, the analog of atk is a vector of outcome
lotteries, with a different outcome lottery for each agent.
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By continuity and independence over identity lotteries, such a V k(z, a) exists and
is unique. To show that this representation is affine, notice that if (V k(z, a)[i tk ] +
(1−V k(z, a))[ j tk ], atk ) ∼ (z, a) and (V k(z′, a) [i tk ] + (1 − V k(z′, a)) [ j tk ] , atk ) ∼(
z′, a
)
then independence over identity lotteries implies ([αV k(z, a) + (1 − α)
V k(z′, a)][i tk ]+[1−αV k(z, a)−(1−α)V k(z′, a)][ j tk ], atk ) ∼ (αz + (1 − α) z′, a).
Hence V k
(
αz + (1 − α) z′, a) = αV k(z, a) + (1 − α) V k(z′, a). Since any identity
lottery z in 	(I) can be written as z = ∑i zi [i], proceeding sequentially on I, affin-
ity implies V k (z, a) = ∑i zi V k (i, a). Finally, by acceptance, V k (i, ·) agrees with
i on the relevant social alternatives in A. Hence, if we define V ki (a) = V k (i, a),
then V ki represents individual i’s preferences on the relevant social alternatives in A.
On this subset, the functions V ki are unique up to common affine transformation.12
Now, as any two adjacent intervals BLtk , BLtk+1 overlap, we can apply an affine
re-normalization of either V k or V k+1 such that the (re-normalized) representations
agree on the ‘overlap’. Since both functions are affine, the re-normalized representa-
tion is affine on BLtk ∪ BLtk+1 and has the form V k,k+1 (z, a) = ∑i zi V k,k+1i (a) as
before. Again, uniqueness follows from standard arguments.
Finally, doing it for any two adjacent intervals yields the desired (unique) represen-
tation function V (z, a) = i zi Vi (a) for , where, for each i in I (by acceptance)
the function Vi (a) := V (i, a) represents i on A.
Case 2 Assume that the set V is finite. We can write V = {v1, . . . , vK−1} where k′ >
k implies vk′ > vk . Assume, without loss of generality, that 0, 1 /∈ V and define v0 := 0
and vK := 1. Fix an interval of the form
[
vk−1, vk
]
, k = 1, . . . , K . If the intersection[
vk−1, vk
]∩T is empty then there is nothing to do. Assume that it is non-empty and note
that, similarly to the argument used in Case 1 to show that T = [0, 1], it now follows
that
[
vk−1, vk
]∩T = [vk−1, vk
]
. By independence over identity lotteries, if V˜ (z, a) ∈
(vk−1, vk) then mini V˜ (i, a) < vk . Hence, by the continuity of  and the definition
of V, maxi V˜ (i, a) ≤ vk . Similarly, maxi V˜ (i, a) > vk−1 and hence mini V˜ (i, a) ≥
vk−1. That is, if V˜ (z, a) ∈ (vk−1, vk) then V˜ (i, a) ∈
[
vk−1, vk
]
for all i . Moreover,
if V˜ (z, a) = vk−1 (resp. vk) then V˜ (i, a) = vk−1 (resp. vk) for all i in the support of
z. Therefore, following the method of case 1, we can construct a function V k (z, a) =
i zi V ki (a) that represents  on
{
(z, ) ∈  (I) × A : V˜ (z, a) ∈ [vk−1, vk
]}
and
we can re-normalize it so that its image equals
[ k−1
K ,
k
K
]
. To conclude, let V˜ (z, a) =
V k (z, a) if V k (z, a) ∈ [vk−1, vk
]
. Notice that, as this construction suggests, we do
not have uniqueness in this case.
Case 3 Assume that V is infinite. For every τ ∈ T \V , if exist, define
τ+ =
{
min {v ∈ V : v > τ } if {v ∈ V : v > τ } = ∅
1 otherwise
τ− =
{
max {v ∈ V : v < τ } if {v ∈ V : v < τ } = ∅
0 otherwise
12 The uniqueness argument is standard: see, for example, Karni and Safra (2000, p. 321).
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Clearly, if τ /∈ {0, 1} then τ− < τ < τ+ (recall V is a closed set). As in Cases 1
and 2, define functions V τ and V τi on
[
τ−, τ+
]
. The set T \V is covered by a count-
able number of disjoint intervals of the form (τ−, τ+) , and hence functions V and Vi
can be constructed (inductively and continuously) on their closed union. In this way,
the functions are also defined for V0, the set of V’s boundary points.
Let v be an interior point of V and let
v+ =
{
min
{
v′ ∈ V0 : v′ > v} if {v′ ∈ V0 : v′ > v} = ∅
1 otherwise
v− =
{
max
{
v′ ∈ V0 : v′ < v} if {v′ ∈ V0 : v′ < v} = ∅
0 otherwise
Clearly, v− < v < v+ and all i agree on {a ∈ A : V˜ (z, a) ∈
(
v−, v+
)
for
some z}. Choose V that (with continuity) agrees with V of the former step at the
indifference sets that are associated with v− and v+, such that it represents  on this
set. To conclude, define
Vi : {a ∈ A : V˜ (z, a) ∈
(
v−, v+
)
for some z} → R
by Vi (a) = V (z, a) and note that V (z, a) = i zi Vi (a) is trivially satisfied. As the
number of (non trivially) open components of V is also countable, the construction of
the desired functions can be carried out easily.
Finally, the proof for V = T is derived as a special case of the previous arguments,
as in this case v− = 0 and v+ = 1. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 1 Consider any non-extreme (with respect to ) (z, x) ∈ 	(I)
× A. Let (zˆ, aˆ) be maximal with respect to  and (z′, a′) be minimal with respect to
 on 	(I) × A. These maxima and minima exist because  is continuous and both
	(I) and A are compact. Because (zˆ, aˆ) is maximal, by independence over identity
lotteries, there exists an i ∈ I such that (i, aˆ) ∼ (zˆ, aˆ). Similarly, there exists a j ∈ I
such that ( j, a′) ∼ (z′, a′). (It could be that zˆ is the degenerate identity lottery [i]
or that z′ is the degenerate identity lottery [ j].) Because (z, a) is non-extreme, we
therefore have (i, aˆ)  (z, x)  ( j, a′). If (i, aˆ) ∼ (i, a′), the result follows by set-
ting a¯ = a′. Otherwise, (i, aˆ)  (i, a′) and, therefore, aˆ i a′ by acceptance. By
absence of unanimity, there then exists a k ∈ I such that a′ k aˆ. By acceptance,
(k, a′)  (k, aˆ). If (z, a)  (k, a′), then (i, aˆ)  (z, a)  (k, aˆ) and the proof is
complete. Otherwise, we have (k, a′)  (z, a)  ( j, a′). unionsq
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